









The Strange Case of Dr. DeVille or, Determinism and Rationality
Prologue: The Strange Case of Doctor DeVille A college student (call him Sam) has agreed to participate in some experiments devised by his neuropsychology professor, Doctor DeVille. Sam is a bright student; he has studied enough logic to understand the basic notions of validity and soundness for deductive arguments, of strength and weakness for inductive arguments, and of intrinsic plausibility for explanations. Deville presents him with various examples of each and proceeds to record Sam’s intuitive judgments about whether the examples are valid, strong or weak, or plausible. When Sam asks him why he is hooked up (via electrodes) to an impressive but unfamiliar machine, DeVille informs him that the purpose of the experiment is to test this device, one that directly influences a subject’s thoughts in such a way as to control what that subject believes. DeVille explains that the machine, which he has pre-programmed, will elicit all of Sam’s intuitive judgments, as well as all of their phenomenological features. DeVille further explains that some of the intuitive judgments produced by the machine will be probably be true and others false, because the principles upon which the machine operates are indifferent to the truth or falsity of the judgments produced by its operation. Finally, DeVille informs Sam that any attempts on Sam’s part to reflect on those judgments and thereby determine whether those initial, intuitive judgments are true will result in the machine’s “taking over” and completely directing that process to a pre-determined result. In some cases, this will result in a revision of the original judgment and in others its reaffirmation, again without regard to the actual truth or falsity of the product of its operation. DeVille assures Sam that, regardless of what judgment he ultimately arrives at, it will be due to the operation of the machine, a causal force whose operations lie beyond his control. Despite this fact, each of these judgments will seem to Sam to be true and correct – indeed, in some cases self-evident – regardless of the fact of the matter.​[1]​
	I take it that in such a case, supposing that Sam does go through with the experiment, that Sam would not be rationally justified in taking any of the judgments he arrives at, whether intuitive or reflective, to be actually true, even though it may well be the case that good number of them, perhaps even all of them, are actually true. After all, he has it on good authority that his judgments are the ineluctable product of a truth-indifferent device that operates in such a manner that the truth of the judgments it produces seems evident regardless of the fact of the matter. Further, he is hooked up to a device whose operation he can neither control nor evade, and whose effects cannot be checked or corrected by any means available to him. Of course, if Sam had not asked about the device, DeVille probably would not have told him about it and Sam would have assumed that the judgments he was making were the actual detection of and response to the logical properties of the examples he was being presented with and such that he could rest considerable confidence in the results. That, however, would be an illusion. Sam would blithely suppose that his intuitive judgments were at least largely sound while all the time DeVille would be laughing up his sleeve at Sam’s predicament. DeVille’s amusement would be in no way lessened even if it turned out that most or even all of Sam’s intuitive judgments did in fact happen to turn out to be true.
	This puts Sam in a rather odd predicament. It is perfectly possible, given the foregoing, that his intuitive judgments are true and that the reasons that incline him to believe those judgments actually sufficient to justify them. Further, there is no difficulty about his having access to those reasons, such that if he were to affirm those judgments because of those reasons he would be objectively justified in his belief. We might say, in those circumstances, that his belief would be objectively rational. However, due his antecedent beliefs about the origin of those judgments and his inability to evaluate them independently of the operation of Dr. DeVille’s device, he is in no position to affirm any of those judgments with any confidence. As such, given the circumstances, none of the beliefs those judgments prompt him to accept could be subjectively rational for him to accept. The objective rationality of some, or even all, of those resultant beliefs would in no way alter that fact; nor would Sam’s access to the reasons inclining him to those beliefs. There is thus no way for Sam rationally to affirm any beliefs whatsoever in the scenario just described.​[2]​
	Keep this example in mind as we proceed. In what follows, I shall be arguing that if determinism is true, we are all of us ineluctably and inescapably in Sam’s condition with regard to every judgment, whether intuitive or reflective, concerning any matter of fact or logic, including whether or not determinism is true.
		______________________________________________
Introduction: On Subjective Rationality

	Most of us suppose that we possess rational beliefs, i.e. beliefs that we have arrived at after due consideration of the relevant evidence or based on explicit argumentation, and that in at least some cases we arrive at and continue to adhere to our beliefs on their basis. Further, we all take it for granted that it lies within our power to form rational beliefs in this way, and many of us (especially philosophers) suppose that we ought to do this and do this more frequently than we do. When philosophers and scientists argue for a thesis, they typically do so by marshalling the relevant evidence, proposing deductive and inductive arguments in favor of their chosen position, and (using the appropriate logical or methodological standards) critically examining that evidence and those arguments in order to determine whether they actually provide the required support for the thesis they are intended to justify. What philosophers and scientists do, however, is hardly unique to their peculiar enterprise: even in what Hume calls our “common life” we frequently and sincerely attempt to justify our actions and beliefs by appeal to reasons and evidence.
	The dispute over determinism and free will is no exception to this general pattern. Scientific and philosophical defenders of determinism write books and journal articles in which they provide what they take to be scientific proof or compelling philosophical arguments in favor the hypothesis of necessity. Presumably, they do so with full sincerity, supposing that their efforts are not pointless but instead hoping that their arguments will persuade us that determinism is a rationally justified doctrine, and commending that doctrine to our belief on the basis of the evidence and arguments they present.
	The thesis of this paper is that, if determinism – in particular, scientific determinism – is true, the foregoing understanding of what is going on in the debate over free will, or with regard to any intellectual dispute, cannot be correct. I will argue that, if determinism of this sort is true, we can have no reason to believe that it lies within our power to either form or adhere to any belief at all on the basis of evidence or argument and that our conviction that this is the case is simply mistaken. In short, if determinism is true, rationality (so understood as subjective rationality) is an illusion and theoretical inquiry a pointless and impossible activity.
Determinism and Rational Belief

According to the sort of scientifically based determinism that interests us here, all states of physical objects, such as the human brain, are causally determined with physical necessity by previous physical events in accordance with the (macroscopically) mechanistic laws of nature. Further, determinists of this sort are likely to maintain that what we pre-scientifically call a belief is a current brain-state or wholly dependent upon such a brain-state and thus the product of a long series of physical events originating in the external world, perhaps in the distant past. Given that the laws of nature are macroscopically deterministic, the physical antecedents of that brain-state ineluctably produce it in a manner wholly explicable in terms of those physical antecedents and the operation of the laws of nature, which provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence. As such, the existence of that brain state will be a physically necessary state of affairs: given those antecedents and those laws it could not have failed to obtain. In principle, then, the physical processes by means of which belief production and adherence take place are no different from that producing any other physical state. On the view being considered here, a belief-state is simply one sort of physical state among others, without any special features or characteristics when viewed from the scientific point of view. 
According to this version of determinism, then, all of our beliefs are the products of purely physical causes that ineluctably produce those beliefs with physical necessity, and this includes beliefs about the strength of the evidence for our beliefs. Either they are at best epiphenomena attending those processes and such as to lack all causal powers or such that their causal powers are identical to (either in the sense of being nothing but or by being reducible without remainder to) those of the physical states they attend. Thus, on this view, non-rational physical processes wholly explain the fact that one believes some proposition for particular reasons taken to be evidence for its truth. Further, it explains those facts in such as manner as not to require any reference to either the actual truth-value of that belief or the evidential value of those reasons taken as justification for those beliefs. The causal connections determining belief in this context, being contingent, physical, and having no intrinsic logical features, will presumably hold regardless of whether or not the propositions expressing those reasons happen to be true or provide the appropriate sort of support required to justify the belief in question. As such, reasons can influence one’s belief only indirectly insofar as they are somehow associated with the prior physical brain-states that causally produce the current brain-state constituting one’s belief, and can exercise no such influence on their own account, i.e. in virtue of their intrinsic logical properties. On this account, then, there is at best a contingent and accidental connection between the causally effective processes that actually produce our beliefs and the causally impotent logical properties of those processes (e.g., validity, strength, soundness, or explanatory adequacy) when reconstructed as logical or explanatory inferences. Indeed, there is no necessity that there should be any correlation at all between the causal effectiveness of those processes in producing our beliefs and their possession of such properties, even if in fact they do possess them.
Given the determinist account of belief acquisition and adherence just adumbrated, any non-rational process that instantiates a valid argument, a successful judgment of probability, or a plausible explanation is at best accidentally rational. Although such processes may in fact instantiate rationally justified inferences, this is merely an accidental, rather than an essential, feature of those processes.  Since the causal efficacy of those processes is explained wholly in terms of antecedent non-rational physical conditions and the operation of deterministic laws of nature to which argument and evidence make no contribution, the fact that they instantiate such inferences has no role to play either in the original production of or continued adherence to the beliefs so produced. In other words, the way in which these processes can be described as rational (i.e. accidentally and fortuitously) plays no role whatsoever in determining what anyone shall believe because of their operation.
A direct consequence of this fact is that the apparent intuitive support that the premises of deductive and inductive arguments or the results of observation and experiment give for beliefs can never constitute genuine reasons for us to embrace those beliefs from the subjective point of view. The non-rational causal factors that determine that we will acquire certain beliefs and hold them on the basis of particular reasons, whatever these may be, produce those results quite independently of the logical relations of implication, inductive support or explanatory power supposed to reside in those reasons and actually conferred by their truth. As such, if determinism is true, that it phenomenologically seems to someone that a certain belief is justified by rational argument, inductive evidence or plausibly explained by some hypothesis provides no reason whatsoever for thinking that this is actually the case. Nor does there appear to be any obvious remedy for this situation, in which case subjectively rational belief, so described, appears to be something beyond our powers to acquire; indeed, the very notion of rational belief (as we ordinarily understand it) seems inconceivable on the determinist account of things.
Worse than this, for all we can possibly know if determinism is true, the process that produces the judgment that a particular set of reasons constitute good reasons for believing something would have made things seem that way regardless of the facts of the matter. After all, if determinism is true, our beliefs are the products of the operation of non-rational forces which are at best accidentally rational and which presumably would have produced the same result even if the belief had been false, the arguments for it insufficient, or its explanans wholly implausible, i.e., even if that causal process had not been accidentally rational.​[3]​ Therefore, if causal processes of this sort determine the entirety of our cognitive processes, it is always possible that any such process might embody a fallacious inference, a faulty application of the scientific method or result in a false belief, no matter how self-evident or logically impeccable it might appear to be when viewed from the subjective point of view. If determinism is true, we are all of us, all the time, in exactly in the same position as Sam in the tale of Doctor DeVille. If so, then we are never in a position to trust any of our judgments concerning the relations between our beliefs and the grounds that putatively support them.
Now, from the pre-scientific point of view (as I noted above) most of us suppose that at least some of our beliefs are subjectively rational beliefs and actually acquired and adhered to on the basis of arguments, evidence, or explanatory grounds we are capable of judging to be good reasons for their truth. However, if the foregoing determinist account of belief formation and adherence is correct, our pre-scientific account of these matters has to be false. If determinism is true, one’s conviction that one’s beliefs are the consequence of one’s consideration of the evidence and arguments in favor of them is simply false. Instead, the process of examining and weighing arguments and evidence for theoretical beliefs – which we ordinarily takes to be the core activity of rational inquiry – can be no more than an evanescent, crepuscular shadow play attending the real, non-rational causal process that produces our beliefs. At most, it is a mere epiphenomenon accompanying the operation of deterministic and at best accidentally rational physical processes to which we are ineluctably subject and whose outcome is determined prior to the process of deliberation, weighing evidence, and so on, upon which we ordinarily suppose we arrive at that belief. The common sense notion of rational belief and the acquisition of and continued adherence to such beliefs, then, proves to be a pre-scientific myth that collapses in the face of the modern scientific understanding of these matters. All the real work is being done at the physical level by non-rational processes that simply dictate that we will believe certain things for certain reasons, without regard to whether those reasons provide any support whatever for what we end up believing on their basis.
Even worse than this, it turns out that on the determinist view, one’s judgment that a certain physical belief-producing process is accidentally rational is no more rationally justifiable than the first-order beliefs produced by that process. For suppose that I examine some particular belief that I hold and the reasons for it and come to conclusion that the combination of the two instantiates e.g., a valid and sound deductive argument, thereby arriving at the judgment that the physical process that produced that belief is accidentally rational. I therefore acquire the belief that the original belief from which I began is true due to its having been produced by a process that is accidentally rational in the sense defined above. However, if determinism is true, that higher-order belief about the accidental rationality of the process that produced the belief from which I began is itself the product of a physical process which is at best accidentally rational and that dictates that I should arrive at and adhere to that meta-belief quite independently of whether that judgment is true. So, then, all my efforts have gained me nothing; if I cannot trust the process the produces my first-order substantive belief, neither can I rest securely in the truth of the judgment that constitutes that belief as the object of the judgment expressed in that meta-belief. Given this, there is no point in even attempting to examine the grounds for our beliefs with regard to their evidential value.
From this, it follows that argument and evidence can play no essential role (i.e., no role as such) in the explanation of the acquisition of and adherence to any of one’s beliefs. As such, if determinism is true, there is no such thing as subjectively rational belief as described above; no one ever actually holds any belief on the basis of argument, evidence or explanatory grounds. To the contrary, since the determinist postulates a complete, physical explanation of belief-production and adherence without the need to make any reference whatsoever to argument or evidence, it is clear that, from the point of view of ultimate explanation, argument and evidence considered in themselves play no role whatsoever in the production of my beliefs or in my subsequent adherence to them. At best, our careful consideration of the evidence is an epiphenomenon that merely attends the real causal processes determining what one will believe, processes which for all we can know if determinism is true may be utterly indifferent to the truth of the beliefs thereby produced. One may experience oneself examining reasons, weighing evidence, drawing inferences, and so on, but if so that will only be because one was caused to do so by purely physical causes over which one have no control and whose causal result is predetermined in a way which, for all anyone can ever know, is utterly indifferent to truth. At worst, then, they are simply something which causal forces outside of our control have imposed on us by processes whose truth-indifferent outcome has already been pre-determined prior to their acquisition. In other words, if determinism is true, rationality is an illusion, in precisely the same way that determinists hold our experiences of free choice and moral responsibility to be illusions.​[4]​ As such, the conviction anyone rests in the results of theoretical inquiry, arrived at through rational discourse, will be illusory as well.


Conclusion: the High Cost of Determinism
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^1	  To make things tidy, let us further suppose that, unbeknownst to Sam, the machine also controls whether or not S will attempt to subject his intuitive judgment to further reflection in order to determine whether that judgment is really true or false – DeVille has deliberately withheld this information from Sam in order to allow the experiment to run more smoothly. This last detail makes the example more like what we may suppose to be the case if determinism is true.
^2	  Hume would say that all that follows from this is that reason is not the source of our beliefs, which must instead be referred to the influence of instinct and custom. However, the consequences of this are more serious than Hume appears to recognize.
^3	  For the same reason, of course, it is also entirely possible that one’s judgments that certain arguments are fallacious or that the grounds for accepting them are insufficient could be erroneous as well.
^4	  Let us note in passing, pace O’Connor (1970) that even if the processes causing our beliefs were intrinsically or essentially rational ones, our position would be no better. From the very fact that ones beliefs are caused by deterministic processes operating beyond one’s effective review and control and whose outcomes are assured prior to our deliberation with regard to their (putatively) rational grounds, we can never be in a position to arrive at any rational judgment concerning the truth, likely truth or explanatory confirmation of any statement whatever. Belief can only be rational if it is the product of the operation of a free, autonomous reason not subject to any sort of ineluctable causal determination. Thus, there is no rationality without free will, and to embrace determinism is inconsistent with the very possibility of rational belief and discourse, or theoretical inquiry.
^5	 See the books by Double, Honderich, Pereboom, and B. F. Skinner in the bibliography.
^6	  Smilansky goes so far as to suggest that human beings are genetically determined to believe that they have free will despite the fact that science proves that this belief is an illusion; see Smilansky (2002) . 
